In the blog entry, 'Counter-Revolutionaries and Little Racists', the writer helpfully directed her attention to the second-order debates of hate speech setting aside the constitutive debates which ask if the internal dynamics of the different justifications for democracy do carry over into the obligation of democratic governments to impose constraints on hate speech.  It doesn’t necessarily follow from the obligations of government that government should impose those same obligations as rules of behavior on non-governmental actors and individuals in the way they treat each other. Discourse which mixes the first-order and second-order issues of hate speech usually-not always- confuses this asymmetry. That the writer was careful not to muddle through that dualism as some did – without providing sufficient reason for mixing the two up - during the Question Time Affair makes the discourse on the role and responsibility of the media and other institutions in liberal democratic regimes where minimalist laws give stringent protections for expressive liberties less confusing.

The basic second-order question raised here is clear: assuming that the laws of a democratic country allow the possible maximum protection for hate speech, how should institutions of a democratic polity which are less constrained by the obligation of neutrality than the government, but have a stake in preserving the democratic polity –like the media- treat hate speech?  The comparison the writer used is, I think, a useful point to start.

On one side are British institutions and citizens who took Griffin’s hate speeches seriously, as dangers to the polity itself. On the other side are many South African institutions and citizens who laugh off several hate utterings by an even more popular politician. I agree with the writer that the examples of speeches she mentioned fall at the core of hate speech category. These speeches explicitly denigrate subsets of political communities in both countries and challenge their rights to equal concern and respect. They either deny or degrade the moral and political status of some members of their polities.

Here is where the comparison becomes tricky. There are distinctions even within the category of disparaging speeches. I call the first one a weaker version of hate speech as it doesn’t direct its salvos at the basic orderings of a democratic state. Malema’s speeches which the writer quoted – those which belittle women, justify rape, degrade reputable political leaders, wage racial divisions – are all hate speeches of this category. The second one is a stronger version of hate speech as it partly directs its salvos at the basic orderings of a democratic state.  There are speeches, say, which envelop in them not only explications of denigration of groups, but call for a formation of a political community which makes sure those groups are denied of equal political and moral status. Nick Griffin’s open support to neo-fascism, for example, can be put in this group. Institutions and citizens of a political community which legally allows both sets of speeches could sensibly consider the first as “vile”, and the second as “dangerous”. Their treatment of the speakers, therefore, could be different. While a person who utters hate speech of the first kind could be condemned and vilified by the polity and no more, any self- preserving political community would try to deny a platform to the second.

But there are two exceptions to this broad assumption. The first relates to context of speech. In a fragile democratic political community, for example, even the weakest forms of hate speech may endanger the polity, and thus institutions and citizens may treat the speeches as more than vile. Considering the history of South Africa, Malema’s speeches, despite their constitutive nature, may pose more danger to South Africa than the stronger Nick Griffin hate speeches pose to Britain. Second, the identity of the person who makes the speech matters to any polity. A speech by a politician who can easily transform expressive action into action can’t be taken at the same level as a speech by an ordinary citizen. Even the most democratic of political communities don’t have an illusion that every citizen has a vertical equality of power.

This leads me to the point where I fully agree with the writer. Malema is a powerful politician and a lot of South Africans who are willing to tolerate the man just don’t take the nation’s democracy seriously.